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“It is true that ‘bitch’ is rarely used of heterosexual males . . . But 
it does not necessarily connote some specific female characteristic, 
whether true, false, or stereotypical; it does not draw attention to the 
woman’s sexual or maternal characteristics or to other respects in 
which women might be thought to be inferior to men in the workplace, 
or unworthy of equal dignity and respect. In its normal usage, it is 
simply a pejorative term for ‘woman.’”1 
— Judge Richard Posner, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
“For over six centuries, bitch has been used as a term of contempt 
toward women.”2 
— Prof. Yvonne Tamayo, Willamette University College of Law 
                                                 
*J.D. candidate, Litigation and Alternative Dispute Resolution Certificate 
candidate, May 2013, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. The author is grateful to her family and friends for their support during 
the writing process. 
1
 Galloway v. Gen. Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1168 (7th 
Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 
536 U.S. 101 (2002). 
2
 Yvonne A. Tamayo, Rhymes with Rich: Power, Law, and the Bitch, 21 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 281, 281 (2009). 
1
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Does calling a female employee “bitch” constitute harassment 
actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?
3
 The 
answer, as often happens to be the case, is a resounding, “it depends.” 
Sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII if the plaintiff can 
prove that she was harassed “because of sex.”4 Early sexual 
harassment cases assumed that this requirement was straightforward 
and did not engage in a rigorous analysis of causation.
5
 Faced 
primarily with fact patterns involving male supervisors who sexually 
propositioned female subordinates, federal judges concluded that the 
causation element was satisfied because the supervisors would not 
have engaged in this conduct but for the employees’ sex.6 As sexual 
harassment law expanded to cover purely verbal claims, courts began 
to treat the sexual content of the harassing language as a shortcut to 
establishing causation.
7
 Consequently, female plaintiffs who were 
subjected to comments involving explicit references to sex or sexual 
organs had more success in convincing judges that they were harassed 
“because of sex” than plaintiffs who were abused in non-sexual 
terms.
8
  
                                                 
3
 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e (2011). 
4
 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (Thomas, 
J., concurring). 
5
 See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 n. 11 (11th Cir. 1982) (“it 
should be clear that sexual harassment is discrimination based upon sex”). 
6
 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942-43 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Barnes v. 
Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“But for her womanhood . . . her 
participation in sexual activity would never have been solicited.”). 
7
 See Jamie Lynn Cook, Comment, Bitch v. Whore: The Current Trend to 
Define the Requirements of an Actionable Hostile Environment Claim in Verbal 
Sexual Harassment Cases, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 465, 489 (2000). 
8
Compare Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 804 (11th 
Cir. 2010) (“bitch,” “fucking bitch,” “fucking whore,” “crack whore,” and “cunt”), 
Forrest v. Brinker Int’l Payroll Co., LP, 511 F.3d 225, 227 (1st Cir. 2007) (“whore,” 
“slut,” “bitch,” and “cunt”), Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 998 (10th 
Cir. 1996) (“floor whore,” “curb whore,” “curb side cunt,” and “bitch”), and Burns 
2
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In the late 1990s, sexual harassment doctrine began to undergo a 
significant theoretical transformation.
9
 Confronted with novel fact 
patterns, courts and scholars were forced to re-examine their 
longstanding interpretation of Title VII’s causation requirement.10 
Three categories of cases engendered particular controversy. The first 
category involved the harassment of gay plaintiffs.
11
 After the 
Supreme Court held that a man can bring a sexual harassment claim 
against another man in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 
12
 
lower courts confronted the issue of whether harassment occasioned 
by plaintiff’s sexual orientation occurs “because of sex.”13 The second 
category included plaintiffs who were exposed to pornographic images 
and sexually charged language at work.
14
 In these cases, judges 
debated whether harassment can be causally attributed to plaintiff’s 
sex if the harassers had engaged in the conduct before plaintiff arrived 
at the workplace
15
 or if the harassers did not specifically single out 
                                                                                                                   
v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 1993) (“bitch,” 
“asshole,” “slut,” and “cunt”), with Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 
1542-43 (10th Cir. 1995) (“dumb,” “get your ass back in the truck,” and “sometimes 
don’t you just want to smash a woman in the face”). 
9
 See Butler v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist. 161 F.3d 263, 267 (5th Cir. 1998). 
10
 See Jaimie Leeser, The Causal Role of Sex in Sexual Harassment, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 1750, 1751-53 (2003). 
11
 See Jeremy S. Barber, Comment, Re-Orienting Sexual Harassment: Why 
Federal Legislation Is Needed to Cure Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Law, 52 AM. U. 
L. REV. 493, 494-97 (2002). 
12
 523 U.S. 75, 78-79(1998). 
13
 See e.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, 579 F.3d 285, 289-91 (3d Cir. 2009); 
Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762-65 (6th Cir. 2006); Dawson v. 
Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217-18 (2d Cir. 2005); Hamm v. Weyauwega 
Milk Prods., 332 F.3d 1058, 1062-65 (7th Cir. 2003); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 
305 F.3d 1061, 1066-68 (9th Cir. 2002); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. and Health 
Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 704-708 (7th Cir. 2000). 
14
 Kristin H. Berger Parker, Comment, Ambient Harassment Under Title VII: 
Reconsidering the Workplace Environment, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 945 (2008). 
15
 Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 341 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(Williams, J., dissenting). 
3
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plaintiff as a target.
16
 The final category concerned cases in which 
supervisors sexually propositioned both men and women, so-called 
“equal opportunity harassment.”17 Although some judges accepted the 
argument that equal opportunity harassers do not discriminate on the 
basis of sex,
18
 this position generated sharp criticism from academics
19
 
and prompted scholars to propose new approaches to establishing 
causation in Title VII cases.
20
 
But despite these emerging theoretical debates, there is one area 
of the law in which the causation element remains underdeveloped and 
underanalyzed. This area involves cases in which female targets are 
harassed through derogatory, but non-sexual, name-calling. While 
some scholars have suggested that such conduct may be gender-
motivated even though it is not explicitly sexual,
21
 currently, there is 
very little guidance on how to establish the Title VII causation element 
in what I refer to as “sexist harassment” cases. The need for clearer 
standards is apparent from the conflicting decisions that several 
circuits have reached on the issue of whether addressing a female 
employee as a “bitch” constitutes sexual harassment.22  
                                                 
16
 Hocevar v. Purdue Frederick Co., 223 F.3d 721, 737 (8th Cir. 2000). 
17
Kyle F. Mothershead, Note, How the "Equal Opportunity" Sexual Harasser 
Discriminates on the Basis of Gender Under Title VII, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1206 
(2002). 
18
 Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2000). 
19
 Mark J. McCullough, Note, One Is a Claim, Two Is a Defense: Bringing an 
End to the Equal Opportunity Harasser Defense, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 469 (2005); 
Shylah Miles, Note, Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Defense: Eliminating the Equal-
Opportunity-Harasser Defense, 76 WASH. L. REV. 603 (2001). 
20
 Leeser, supra n. 10, at 1782-83 (proposing a Motivating Factor and 
Foreseeability Test to replace “but-for” causation in Title VII cases). 
21
 See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 
1683, 1685-88 (1998). 
22
 Compare Hocevar v. Purdue Frederick Co., 223 F.3d 721, 737 (8th Cir. 
2000) (“mere use of the word ‘bitch’ without other evidence of sex discrimination, is 
not particularly probative of a general misogynist attitude”), and Kriss v. Sprint 
Commc’ns Co., Ltd. P’ship, 58 F.3d 1276, 1781 (8th Cir. 1995) (bitch “is not an 
indication of a general misogynist attitude) with Reeves v. C.H. Robinson 
4
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The Seventh Circuit considered this question in two cases. In 
Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations, the court 
opined that the word “bitch” was not a sex- or gender-related term.23 
More recently, in Passananti v. Cook County, the court declared that 
“[t]he word is gender-specific, and it can reasonably be considered 
evidence of sexual harassment.”24 Despite reaching different 
conclusions about the meaning of “bitch,” both Galloway and 
Passananti analyzed the Title VII causation element in the same 
manner.
25
 In each of these cases, the Seventh Circuit assumed that the 
key issue was figuring out the harasser’s attitude toward women.26 
Taken together, these opinions impose a subjective motivation 
standard in sexist harassment cases.
27
 The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning 
suggests that a plaintiff claiming sexist harassment needs to present 
some evidence that the harasser was subjectively motivated by gender 
hostility in order to establish that the harassment occurred “because of 
sex.”28 This approach to analyzing causation essentially requires the 
court to get inside the harasser’s head. 
This Note contends that Title VII does not mandate an inquiry into 
the harasser’s subjective mental state to establish the causation 
element in harassment cases. The subjective motivation standard 
adopted by the Seventh Circuit erroneously borrows an intent-based 
causation requirement from discrimination cases involving adverse 
employment decisions. This approach is too deferential to employers 
because harassment, unlike a personnel decision, does not entail a 
presumptively valid exercise of business judgment.
29
 In addition, the 
                                                                                                                   
Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 810 (11th Cir. 2010) (“when a co-worker calls a 
female employee a ‘bitch,’ the word is gender-derogatory”). 
23
 78 F.3d 1164, 1167 (7th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Nat’l 
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002). 
24
 689 F.3d 655, 666 (7th Cir. 2012). 
25
 See Passananti, 689 F.3d at 664-67; Galloway 78 F.3d at 1167-68. 
26
 See Passananti, 689 F.3d at 664-67; Galloway 78 F.3d at 1167-68. 
27
 See Passananti, 689 F.3d at 664-67; Galloway 78 F.3d at 1167-68. 
28
 See Passananti, 689 F.3d at 664-67; Galloway 78 F.3d at 1167-68. 
29
 See David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation 
Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1717-18 (2002). 
5
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assumption that actionable harassment must be driven by conscious 
hostility toward women ignores the reality that discrimination today is 
more likely to result from unconscious bias.
30
 
The argument advanced by this Note proceeds in four parts. Part I 
places sexual harassment claims in historical context by discussing the 
enactment of Title VII and reviewing major Supreme Court cases in 
this area. Part II analyzes the Seventh Circuit decisions in Galloway 
and Passananti, focusing on how these cases deal with the issue of 
causation. Part III explores the inherent ambiguity in the meaning of 
the phrase “because of sex” in Title VII and examines the divergent 
approaches to causation taken by the Seventh Circuit in sexual 
harassment and sexist harassment cases. Part IV proposes and 
evaluates alternative ways of approaching causation in sexist 
harassment cases. 
 
PART I: THE TROUBLE WITH SEX – A BRIEF HISTORY OF SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII 
 
A. Working Women and Title VII 
 
Reports of women working outside of the home predate the 
establishment of the United States as a country.
31
 For centuries, 
women were employed as farmers, midwives, and housekeepers.
32
 As 
wage labor entered a period rapid expansion in the early 1900s, more 
women were hired as factory workers, secretaries, and waitresses.
33
 
After gaining access to higher education in mid-twentieth century, 
                                                 
30
 See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A 
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995). 
31
 DEBRAN ROWLAND, THE BOUNDARIES OF HER BODY: THE TROUBLING 
HISTORY OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN AMERICA 49 (1st ed. 2004). See generally 
AMERICA’S WORKING WOMEN: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1600 TO THE PRESENT 
(Rosalyn Baxendall and Linda Perlman Gordon, eds., W.W. Norton 1995) (1976). 
32
 AMERICA’S WORKING WOMEN, supra n. 31, at 3-15. 
33
 See id. at xxi. 
6
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women began to enter the labor force as professionals.
34
 Today, most 
educated women work in an office environment.
35
 
Despite this lengthy legacy of paid employment, women in 
America have historically encountered resistance to their presence in 
the workforce.
36
 This resistance was primarily fueled by specific 
beliefs about appropriate gender roles.
37
 Paid employment seemed 
incompatible with women’s traditional social identities as wives, 
mothers, caregivers, and subordinates.
38
 For this reason, married 
women met particularly harsh disapproval for making the choice to 
work outside of the home.
39
 Wives were told that their paid 
employment would make their husbands feel inadequate
40
 and that 
their absence from the family home would turn their children into 
juvenile delinquents.
41
 
In the late 1950s, several progressive social movements began to 
challenge established political institutions and criticize the treatment 
of women and minorities.
42
 In response to the growing demand for 
civil rights reform,
43
 Congress, in 1964, enacted a landmark anti-
discrimination law, which came to be popularly known as Title VII.
44
 
Title VII prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”45 Over time, Title VII evolved into a 
powerful weapon against gender and race discrimination and became 
                                                 
34
 See id. at 288, 299. 
35
 Id. at 299. 
36
 ROWLAND, supra n. 31, at 49-50. 
37
 Id. 
38
 Id. at 34. 
39
 AMERICA’S WORKING WOMEN, supra n. 31, at xxii. 
40
 Id. at xxii.  
41
 Id. at 269. 
42
 Id. at 287. 
43
 Id. 
44
 Leeser, supra n. 10, at 1753. 
45
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2011). 
7
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an important tool in advancing the economic and social progress of 
women and minorities.
46
  
Although the plain language of Title VII proscribes discrimination 
“because of . . . sex,” this provision was added to the statute at the last 
minute on the floor of the House of Representatives.
47
 Representative 
Howard Smith of Virginia strategically proposed including “sex” in 
the list of classifications to be protected by Title VII in an effort to 
divide the bill’s supporters and thwart its passage.48 His plan backfired 
and Title VII was enacted into law with the proposed sex 
amendment.
49
 As a result of this unusual history, there is no legislative 
guidance available to assist courts in interpreting the phrase “because 
of sex.”50 This lack of guidance initially prompted judges to express 
doubt about whether sexual harassment constitutes discrimination on 
the basis of sex.
51
 
 
B. The Emergence of Sexual Harassment as Discrimination “Because 
of Sex” 
 
Sexual harassment cases began to reach federal courts for the first 
time in the mid-1970s.
52
 At that time, judges were reluctant to hold 
that sexual harassment amounted to discrimination because of sex.
53
 
The first officially reported case characterized harassment as “nothing 
more than a personal proclivity” and an attempt to satisfy “a personal 
                                                 
46
 ROWLAND, supra n. 31, at 157. 
47
 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986). 
48
 Cook, supra n. 7, at 467. 
49
 Id. 
50
 Id. at 468. 
51
 Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), 
vacated sub nom. Corne v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc., 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(“there is nothing in the Act which could reasonably be construed to have it apply to 
‘verbal and physical sexual advances' by another employee”). 
52
 CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 60 
(1979). 
53
 Leeser, supra n. 10, at 1753. 
8
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urge.”54 Another early opinion reframed the issue to argue that sexual 
harassment was discrimination against those who refuse sexual 
advances rather than discrimination based on the victim’s sex.55 Still 
another case suggested that sexual harassment would not be actionable 
under Title VII unless an employer actually adopted a policy requiring 
sexual favors as a condition of employment.
56
 
In 1979, feminist scholar Catharine MacKinnon became the first 
legal theorist to formally link sexual harassment to discrimination 
against women.
57
 In her seminal book, The Sexual Harassment of 
Working Women, MacKinnon defined sexual harassment as “the 
unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a 
relationship of unequal power.”58 MacKinnon argued that sexual 
harassment derives its potency from two power sources: male 
dominance of women and the employer’s control over workers.59 The 
two forms of inequality, one sexual, the other economic, combine to 
cumulatively reinforce “women’s traditional and inferior role in the 
labor force.”60 
MacKinnon’s book identified two forms of sexual harassment.61 
The first type, which MacKinnon termed quid pro quo harassment, 
involves a direct exchange of sexual favors for employment 
opportunities.
62
 The second type, which is currently known as a hostile 
work environment claim,
63
 arises when sexual harassment becomes a 
                                                 
54
 Corne, 390 F. Supp at 163. 
55
 MACKINNON, supra n. 52, at 66 (discussing Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123, 124 (D.D.C. 1974)). 
56
 Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev’d, 600 
F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979). 
57
 Linda Kelly Hill, The Feminist Misspeak of Sexual Harassment, 57 FLA. L. 
REV. 133, 145 (2005). 
58
 MACKINNON, supra n. 52, at 1. 
59
 Id. 
60
 Id. at 4. 
61
 Id. at 32. 
62
 Id. 
63
 Hill, supra n. 57, at 146. 
9
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persistent condition of work.
64
 After MacKinnon’s book was 
published, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”), the federal agency responsible for enforcing employment 
discrimination laws, issued a set of guidelines on sexual harassment.
65
 
The EEOC guidelines adopted the framework proposed by 
MacKinnon and defined sexual harassment as:  
 
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and 
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature . . . when 
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or 
implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, 
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an 
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions 
affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose 
or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's 
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or 
offensive working environment.
66
 
 
C. Meritor, Harris, and Oncale: The Supreme Court Weighs in on 
Sexual Harassment Claims 
 
Although lower courts had been struggling with issue of sexual 
harassment since the late 1970s,
67
 the Supreme Court did not address 
the question of whether sexual harassment is prohibited by Title VII 
until 1986.
68
 The first sexual harassment case to reach the Supreme 
Court was Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.
69
 The plaintiff in 
                                                 
64
 MACKINNON, supra n. 52, at 32. 
65
 See Robert J. Gregory, You Can Call Me a “Bitch” Just Don't Use the “N-
Word”: Some Thoughts on Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations 
and Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Insurance Co., 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 741, 743 
(1997). 
66
 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2012). 
67
 See, e.g., Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 
1977); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
68
 See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
69
 Id.  
10
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 7
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol8/iss1/7
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 8, Issue 1                              Fall 2012 
 
162 
 
Meritor alleged that over the course of her four-year employment with 
the bank her supervisor repeatedly demanded sexual favors, pressured 
her into having sexual intercourse with him, fondled her in front of 
other employees, exposed himself to her, and forcibly raped her.
70
 The 
Court held that such conduct is actionable under Title VII and that a 
plaintiff may establish a violation of the statute by “proving that 
discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work 
environment.”71  
In finding the alleged harassment actionable, the Meritor Court 
focused on the severity of the conduct rather than on the causal link 
between the behavior and plaintiff’s gender.72 Although the Court 
stated that “when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because 
of the subordinate’s sex, the supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ on the basis 
of sex,”73 the opinion contains no other analysis of causation. Instead, 
the Court adopted the following standard for evaluating hostile work 
environment claims: “[f]or sexual harassment to be actionable, it must 
be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the 
victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’”74 
Following Meritor, lower courts established severity as a separate 
element of a sexual harassment claim.
75
 
The Supreme Court elaborated on the severity requirement in 
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.
76
 Plaintiff Teresa Harris alleged that 
her supervisor had said to her several times, “You’re a woman, what 
do you know?”, called her “a dumb ass woman,” suggested the two of 
them go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate her raise, asked her to get 
coins from his front pants pocket, asked her to pick up objects he 
                                                 
70
 Id. at 60. 
71
 Id. at 66. 
72
 See id. at 67. 
73
 Id. at 64. 
74
 Id. at 67 (internal citations omitted). 
75
 See, e.g., Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 213 (7th Cir. 1986), 
abrogated by Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1993). 
76
 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993). 
11
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threw on the ground, and made sexual innuendos about her clothing.
77
 
The District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee held that this 
conduct did not create an abusive working environment because it was 
not so severe as to seriously affect plaintiff’s psychological well-
being.
78
 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that while 
psychological harm is relevant, it is not required to establish a hostile 
or abusive work environment.
79
 Instead, the Court laid out a two-part 
test to determine whether the alleged conduct is severe enough to 
constitute a violation of Title VII. The conduct must be (1) severe or 
pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work 
environment and (2) the victim must subjectively perceive the 
environment as abusive.
80
 
Like the Meritor Court, the Harris majority focused on the 
severity element and did not address causation.
81
 But Justice 
Ginsburg’s concurrence in Harris shed some light on what evidence 
might be required to satisfy Title VII’s textual prohibition of 
discrimination because of sex.
82
 Justice Ginsburg argued that the 
critical inquiry in sexual harassment cases “is whether members of one 
sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of 
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.”83 
Some courts subsequently interpreted this pronouncement to mean that 
in order to establish a violation of Title VII, a plaintiff must prove that 
the harasser would not have engaged in the conduct “but for” the 
plaintiff’s sex.84 
The first Supreme Court case to offer an extended discussion of 
causation in the context of a sexual harassment claim was Oncale v. 
                                                 
77
 Id. at 19. 
78
 Id. at 19-20. 
79
 Id. at 23. 
80
 Id. at 21-22. 
81
 Id. at 20-23. 
82
 Id. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
83
 Id.  
84
 See Leeser, supra n. 10, at 1752. 
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Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.
85
 In Oncale, the Court for the first 
time confronted the emerging problem of same-sex harassment.
86
 
Plaintiff Joseph Oncale worked as part of an eight-man crew on an oil 
platform in the Gulf of Mexico.
87
 On several occasions, Oncale’s co-
worker and two supervisors subjected him to humiliating sex-related 
actions, physically assaulted him, and threatened him with rape.
88
 The 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and the Fifth 
Circuit both concluded that Oncale, as a male, had no cause of action 
under Title VII against his male harassers.
89
 The Supreme Court 
reversed, stating that there is “no justification in the statutory language 
or our precedents for a categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment 
claims from the coverage of Title VII.”90  
The Oncale Court then went on to consider how plaintiffs in 
same-sex harassment cases could establish that the harassment 
occurred “because of sex.”91 The Court listed three possible ways to 
establish causation, without specifying whether this list is exhaustive 
or merely illustrative.
92
 First, in cases involving explicit or implicit 
proposals of sexual activity, a plaintiff can establish the causation 
element by presenting credible evidence that the harasser is 
homosexual, since presumably such proposals would not have been 
made but for the plaintiff’s sex.93 Second, a plaintiff can establish 
causation through direct evidence of gender animus, “for example, if a 
female victim is harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by 
another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by 
general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace.”94 
                                                 
85
 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
86
 See id. at 76. 
87
 Id. at 77. 
88
 Id. 
89
 Id. 
90
 Id. at 79. 
91
 Id. at 80. 
92
 See Leeser, supra n. 10, at 1760. 
93
 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. 
94
 Id. 
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Finally, a plaintiff can offer “direct comparative evidence about how 
the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex 
workplace.”95 
The Oncale opinion suggests that the causation element is 
straightforward in male-female sexual harassment situations involving 
proposals of sexual activity since “it is reasonable to assume those 
proposals would not have been made to someone of the same sex.”96 
But the opinion does not explicitly address how to establish causation 
in situations when the harassment involves non-sexual insults. Is direct 
evidence of gender animus necessary? Must a plaintiff present 
comparative evidence? The lack of guidance in this area has forced the 
Seventh Circuit to grapple with the ambiguities and subtleties inherent 
in the phrase “because of sex” in two cases involving male harassers, 
female targets, and non-sexual language.
97
 The next section examines 
these decisions. 
 
PART II: THE TROUBLE WITH “BITCH” – SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS IN 
GALLOWAY AND PASSANANTI 
 
A. Galloway: The Personal Animus Defense 
 
Rochelle Galloway was a packer in the parts department of 
General Motors.
98
 Between 1985 and 1986, Galloway dated a 
coworker named Bullock.
99
 After their relationship ended, Bullock 
began to refer to Galloway as a “sick bitch” and continued this 
behavior until she quit her position at General Motors in 1991.
100
 
Bullock once told Galloway, “If you don’t want me, bitch, you won’t 
                                                 
95
 Id. at 80-81. 
96
 Id. at 80. 
97
 See Passananti v. Cook Cnty., 689 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2012); Galloway v. 
Gen. Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir. 1996), abrogated on 
other grounds by Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002). 
98
 Galloway, 78 F.3d at 1165. 
99
 Id. 
100
 Id. 
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have a damn thing,” and, on another occasion, he said, “suck this, 
bitch,” while making an obscene gesture at her.101 Galloway brought 
suit under Title VII, alleging that General Motors discriminated 
against her on the basis of her sex.
102
 The District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois granted General Motors’ motion for 
summary judgment, holding that Galloway failed to establish that her 
working environment was objectively hostile and remarking that the 
term “sick bitch” was not overtly sexual in nature.103 Galloway 
appealed pro se to the Seventh Circuit.
104
 
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that “sick bitch” 
was not a sex- or gender-related term under the particular 
circumstances of this case.
105
 Writing for a unanimous majority, then-
Chief Judge Richard Posner opined that the word “bitch” in and of 
itself does not “connote some specific female characteristic, whether 
true, false, or stereotypical; it does not draw attention to the woman's 
sexual or maternal characteristics or to other respects in which women 
might be thought to be inferior to men in the workplace, or unworthy 
of equal dignity and respect.”106 Judge Posner then added, “Even if 
Bullock didn’t abuse any men, there would not be an automatic 
inference from his use of the word ‘bitch’ that his abuse of a woman 
was motivated by her gender rather than by a personal dislike 
unrelated to gender.”107 The Seventh Circuit concluded that the term 
“bitch” reflected a personal animosity when used in the context of a 
failed sexual relationship.
108
 The court also stressed that the plaintiff 
did not present any evidence that her harasser believed that “women 
                                                 
101
 Id. 
102
 Id. 
103
 Galloway v. Gen. Motors Serv. Parts Operations, No. 92 C 5987, 1994 WL 
673061 at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 1994), aff'd, 78 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir. 1996), 
abrogated on other grounds by Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 
(2002). 
104
 Galloway, 78 F.3d at 1165. 
105
 Id. at 1168. 
106
 Id. 
107
 Id. 
108
 Id. 
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do not belong in the work force or are not entitled to equal treatment 
with male employees.”109 
Although the court determined that Galloway’s claim was 
properly dismissed, it did go on to caution that its holding should not 
be interpreted to suggest that the word “bitch” could never be used to 
establish sex discrimination.
110
 The court emphasized that “context is 
everything” and pointed out that “‘bitch’ is sometimes used as a label 
for women who possess such ‘woman faults’ as ‘ill-temper, 
selfishness, malice, cruelty, and spite,’ and latterly as a label for 
women considered by some men to be too aggressive or careerist.”111 
The court opined that there was very little indication that the word 
“bitch” carried any of these connotations as used by Bullock of 
Galloway,
112
 but it remains unclear how the court could have reached 
this conclusion short of simply making assumptions about what the 
harasser was thinking. 
 
B. Passananti: It’s All About Context 
 
Kimberly Passananti was the Deputy Director of the Day 
Reporting Center (“DRC”) of the Cook County Sheriff’s Department 
from 2002 until 2007.
113
 For several years, DRC Director, John 
Sullivan, supervised Passananti.
114
 During the course of their 
professional relationship, Sullivan “repeatedly and angrily called 
Passananti a ‘bitch’” in front of coworkers, “trumped up charges 
against her for violating a DRC policy against tampering with 
supervisees’ urine samples,” and “fabricated an accusation that she had 
had sexual relations with a supervisee.”115 Sullivan left the DRC in 
                                                 
109
 Id. 
110
 Id. 
111
 Id. 
112
 Id. 
113
 Passananti v. Cook Cnty., 689 F.3d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 2012). 
114
 Id. 
115
 Id. at 658-59. 
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2006 and Passananti subsequently lost her job in 2007.
116
 Passananti 
brought claims of sexual harassment and sex discrimination under 
both Title VII and § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
117
 Following 
an exchange with counsel at trial, the district court decided to treat 
Passananti’s sexual harassment claim as arising under Title VII and her 
discriminatory termination claim as arising under § 1983.
118
 The 
following analysis focuses solely on Passananti’s Title VII sexual 
harassment claim. 
After the jury returned a verdict in favor of Passananti, Defendant 
Cook County renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law.
119
 
The district court granted the motion, citing to Galloway for the 
proposition that “the mere fact that a defendant used a pejorative term 
that is more likely to be directed toward a female than a male does not 
alone establish unwelcome sexual conduct.”120 The district court 
concluded that “the evidence is insufficient for a rational jury to 
conclude that Sullivan's sometimes-vulgar conduct was directed at 
Plaintiff because she is a woman and that it was so severe or pervasive 
that it rendered her work environment hostile as a matter of law.”121 
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision with 
respect to Passananti’s sexual harassment claim, holding that “[t]he 
jury could reasonably treat the frequent and hostile use of the word 
‘bitch’ to be a gender-based epithet that contributed to a sexually 
hostile work environment.”122 The Passananti Court pointed to the 
                                                 
116
 Id. at 659. 
117
 Passananti, 689 F.3d at 659. Section 1983 gives individuals a private cause 
of action for a violation of their constitutional rights “under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 
Columbia.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2011). 
118
 Passananti, 689 F.3d 663. 
119
 Id. at 658. 
120
 Passananti v. Cnty. of Cook, Ill., No. 08-CV-2803, 2010 WL 3958645, at 
*7-8 (N.D. Ill. 2010), reconsideration denied, No. 08-CV-2803, 2011 WL 198131 
(N.D. Ill. 2011), and aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Passananti v. Cook Cnty., 
689 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2012). 
121
 Id. at *8. 
122
 Passananti, 689 F.3d at 659. 
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passage in the Galloway decision emphasizing the importance of 
context and, on this basis, interpreted Galloway as recognizing that 
“repeated use of the word ‘bitch’ to demean a female employee could 
support a claim of sexual harassment if it was sufficiently pervasive or 
severe and if the context showed a hostility to the plaintiff because she 
was a woman.”123 The Passananti Court identified the fact that the 
defendant in Galloway harbored a personal animosity toward the 
plaintiff arising out of an earlier failed relationship as the relevant 
context in that case.
124
 The Passananti Court then concluded that there 
was no such contextual evidence in this case to undermine the 
inference “that Sullivan’s repeated and hostile use of ‘bitch’ to address 
and demean Passananti was based on her sex.”125 
Although Passananti distinguished Galloway and did not overrule 
it, the Passananti Court apparently perceived the use of the word 
“bitch” as a stronger indication of animosity toward women than did 
the Galloway Court. The Passananti Court approvingly quoted an en 
banc opinion from the Eleventh Circuit holding that “when a co-
worker calls a female employee a ‘bitch,’ the word is gender-
derogatory.”126 The court further opined that “[a]dditional evidence 
that ‘bitch’ is ‘sex based’ for purposes of establishing gender-based 
harassment is not necessary”127 and it rejected “the idea that a female 
plaintiff who has been subjected to repeated and hostile use of the 
word ‘bitch’ must produce evidence beyond the word itself to allow a 
jury to infer that its use was derogatory towards women.”128 At the 
same time, the court attempted to limit the scope of its decision by 
stating, “We do not hold that use of the word ‘bitch’ is harassment 
‘because of sex’ always and in every context, just as we did not hold 
                                                 
123
 Id. at 665. 
124
 Id. 
125
 Id. 
126
 Passananti, 689 F.3d at 665 (quoting Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, 
Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 810 (11th Cir. 2010)). 
127
 Passananti, 689 F.3d at 665. 
128
 Id. at 666. 
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that it never is in Galloway. Our precedents have made clear that the 
use of the word in the workplace must be viewed in context.”129 
 
C. Galloway v. Passananti – What Are We Really Fighting About? 
 
In addition to taking different sides in a debate on the meaning of 
the term “bitch,” Galloway and Passananti raise the challenging legal 
question of how plaintiffs can establish causation in sexist harassment 
cases. Implicit in both decisions is the assumption that in order to 
prove that the harassment occurred “because of sex,” the harasser must 
be subjectively motivated by hostility toward women in the 
workplace
130
 or hostility to the plaintiff because she is a woman.
131
 
The difference between the two cases is their view of what evidence 
plaintiffs must present in order to prove the existence of such hostility. 
In Galloway, the court concluded that the word ‘bitch’ is in and of 
itself insufficient to establish hostility toward women in the workplace 
because the word is not gender-specific.
132
 Although the word may be 
used to denigrate women, plaintiff presented no evidence that her 
harasser intended to use it in this way.
133
 Instead, the court inferred 
another motive from the fact that the harasser and victim dated in the 
past– personal animus.134 The weight the court gave to this alternative 
explanation suggests that the harasser’s subjective motivation was 
dispositive in Galloway.
135
 
In Passananti, the court took a slightly different approach. It 
concluded that the term ‘bitch’ is gender-specific.136 This conclusion 
                                                 
129
 Id. 
130
 See Galloway v. Gen. Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1168 
(7th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. 
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002). 
131
 See Passananti, 689 F.3d at 665. 
132
 Galloway, 78 F.3d at 1167. 
133
 Id. at 1168. 
134
 Id. 
135
 See Gregory, supra n. 65, at 767. 
136
 Passananti, 689 F.3d at 665-66. 
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allowed the court to infer that the harasser could have been motivated 
by a desire to demean the plaintiff as a woman.
137
 But the court 
explicitly limited its holding by stating that the word “bitch” is not 
harassment “because of sex” in every context.138 The court pointed out 
that the context is different in this case than in Galloway, because, 
unlike in Galloway, there is no evidence indicating the alternative 
explanation of personal animus.
139
 This qualification suggests that the 
court employed the term “context” as shorthand for the harasser’s 
subjective motivation. 
The fact that the Galloway and Passananti decisions both seemed 
concerned with pinning down precisely what could have motivated the 
harasser to use the term “bitch” leads to the fundamental question: 
what evidence does the Seventh Circuit require to prove that 
harassment occurred “because of sex”? The next section explores the 
thorny issue of causation in sexual harassment cases. 
 
PART III: THE TROUBLE WITH CAUSE – WHAT WERE THEY THINKING, 
ANYWAY? 
 
A. “Because of Sex” – The Bifurcated Jurisprudence of Causation in 
Title VII Discrimination Cases 
 
The phrase “because of sex” in Title VII implies that there must 
be a relationship between the offending conduct and the victim’s sex, 
but the statute does not specify the precise nature of that 
relationship.
140
 Courts have approached this causation element 
differently in cases involving personnel decisions and in cases 
involving harassment.
141
 In personnel decision cases brought under the 
disparate treatment theory, courts have assumed that Title VII liability 
                                                 
137
 Id. at 665. 
138
 Id. at 666. 
139
 Id. 
140
 See Schwartz, supra n. 29, at 1709. 
141
 See id. at 1718. 
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is premised on a conscious intent to discriminate.
142
 This assumption 
has resulted in much confusion about the terms “discrimination,”143 
“motive,” and “intent,” and has produced a theory of causation that is 
incoherent and inconsistent with contemporary psychology’s 
understanding of intergroup bias.
144
 By contrast, harassment cases 
have traditionally offered almost no analysis of the causation 
element.
145
 These cases were willing to simply infer a causal 
connection between the conduct and the sex of the victim from the 
nature of the harassment itself.
146
 This approach has been called into 
question by the Supreme Court’s decision in Oncale147 and has left 
current causation jurisprudence in a state of uncertainty. 
 
1. The Problem of Discriminatory Intent in Disparate Treatment Cases 
 
Traditionally, Title VII doctrine has subdivided cases involving 
personnel decisions into two categories: intentional discrimination, 
known as “disparate treatment,” and unintentional discrimination, 
known as “disparate impact.”148 To establish liability under a disparate 
impact theory, a plaintiff must show that a facially neutral employment 
practice has a disproportionate impact on a protected group.
149
 No 
showing of discriminatory intent is required.
150
 By contrast, plaintiffs 
bringing claims under a disparate treatment theory must establish 
intent to discriminate.
151
 
                                                 
142
 Krieger, supra n. 30, at 1172 
143
 See Schwartz, supra n. 29, at 1711. 
144
 See Krieger, supra n. 30, at 1165. 
145
 See Schwartz, supra n. 29, at 1718. 
146
 See id. at 1717-25 (discussing the development of a “sex per se” rule). 
147
 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
148
 See Schwartz, supra n. 29, at 1714.  
149
 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
150
 Id. at 432. 
151
 Schwartz, supra n. 29, at 1710. 
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The idea of “intentional discrimination” is more complex than 
most court opinions suggest.
152
 First, the term “discrimination” is itself 
ambiguous.
153
 Discrimination could simply refer to differential 
treatment.
154
 Alternatively, discrimination could be conceptualized as 
involving an invidious attitude toward members of a particular 
group.
155
 The first definition is expressed in Justice Ginsburg’s 
concurrence in Harris, “The critical issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is 
whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or 
conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not 
exposed.”156 The second definition is embraced by Justice Rehnquist 
in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, where he argues that disparate 
treatment “is not the equivalent of a factual finding of discrimination” 
but “simply proof of actions taken by the employer from which we 
infer discriminatory animus because experience has proved that in the 
absence of any other explanation it is more likely than not that those 
actions were bottomed on impermissible considerations.”157  
The analysis of what evidence is necessary to establish intentional 
discrimination under Title VII is further complicated by the fact that 
courts tend to conflate the terms “motive” and “intent” in Title VII 
cases.
158
 These concepts are not equivalent.
159
 Motive is a “synonym 
for ‘actuating factor,’ – something which causes a person to act or 
decide in a particular way.”160 By contrast, intent refers to the state of 
mind accompanying the action or decision.
161
 Confusing these ideas 
has serious implications for how courts analyze disparate treatment 
                                                 
152
 Id. at 1715. 
153
 Id. at 1711. 
154
 Id. 
155
 See id. 
156
 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring). 
157
 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978). 
158
 Krieger, supra n. 30, at 1243. 
159
 Id.  
160
 Id. 
161
 Id. 
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cases.
162
 It is the difference between asking, “did the defendant act 
with the intent to discriminate against the plaintiff because she is a 
woman?” and “did the defendant take this action because the plaintiff 
is a woman?” 
Furthermore, even when judges premise Title VII liability on 
discriminatory motive rather than discriminatory intent, they 
nonetheless assume that such motive is consciously known to the actor 
at the time that the action is taken.
163
 This assumption is reflected in 
Justice Brennan’s discussion of motivating factors in Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins: “In saying that gender played a motivating part in an 
employment decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the 
moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we received a 
truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the applicant or 
employee was a woman.”164 Justice Brennan’s analysis suggests that 
employers are rational actors who are fully aware of all the reasons 
that influence their decisions.
165
 
The imprecise definition of discrimination, the confusion between 
intent and motive, and the assumption of decisionmaker self-
awareness can all, in some way, be linked to judicial reliance on an 
outdated theory of social psychology.
166
 Up until the 1970s, 
psychologists understood intergroup bias as a motivational process.
167
 
Discrimination, a behavior, was believed to result from prejudice, an 
attitude.
168
 The attitude of prejudice was connected to the behavior of 
discrimination by a discriminatory motive, which was defined as “a 
conscious behavioral intention to create social distance by denying 
outgroup members certain benefits and opportunities.”169 
                                                 
162
 See id. at 1172. 
163
 Krieger, supra n. 30, at 1187. 
164
 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074. 
165
 Krieger, supra n. 30, at 1187. 
166
 See id. at 1165. 
167
 Id. at 1187. 
168
 See id. at 1776. 
169
 Id. at 1177. 
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The emergence of social cognition theory has fundamentally 
transformed thinking about intergroup bias.
170
 Psychologists now 
believe that the origin of discrimination is more likely cognitive than 
motivational.
171
 To make sense of our complex environment, we put 
objects and people into categories.
172
 This categorization process is 
adaptive; if we perceived every object as unique “we would rapidly be 
inundated by an unmanageable complexity that would quickly 
overwhelm our processing and storage capabilities.”173 The need to 
classify our surroundings leads to the formation of stereotypes.
174
 
Stereotypes operate beyond our self-awareness.
175
 They are automatic 
and unintentional.
176
 They also bias how we process information about 
other people.
177
 In sum, contemporary psychological theory now 
conceives of discrimination as “an unwelcome byproduct of otherwise 
adaptive cognitive processes.”178 
Although some instances of overt deliberate discrimination no 
doubt still occur, discrimination today is more likely to be subtle, 
unconscious, and unintentional.
179
 Thus, by equating Title VII’s 
causation requirement with intent to discriminate, courts have adopted 
a standard that is inconsistent with the real-world phenomenon of 
intergroup bias.
180
 For this reason, some scholars have proposed 
reforming the current approach to causation in disparate treatment 
cases.
181
 For instance, David Oppenheimer has advocated replacing 
the intentional discrimination requirement with a negligence standard 
                                                 
170
 Id. at 1187. 
171
 Id. 
172
 Id. at 1188. 
173
 Id. 
174
 Id. at 1187. 
175
 Id. at 1188. 
176
 Id. 
177
 Id. at 1190. 
178
 Id. at 1218. 
179
 Id. at 1241. 
180
 See id. 
181
 Id. 
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and imposing on employers a duty to correct for cognitive bias by 
carefully screening their decision-making procedures.
182
 Linda Krieger 
has suggested that Title VII adopt a two-tier liability system, similar to 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, in which a willful 
violation of the statute triggers a more substantial damage award than 
unconscious discrimination.
183
 
 
2. Causation in Harassment Cases 
 
Unlike cases involving actual personnel decisions, hostile work 
environment cases arising under Title VII have developed with less 
attention to the intent of discrimination.
184
 There are two possible 
explanations for this trend. First, harassment cases do not involve a 
“decision.”185 As a result, there is no specific point in time at which it 
would be appropriate to examine the actor’s mental state. Second, 
harassment serves no legitimate business purpose.
186
 In cases 
involving personnel decisions, courts may have fashioned a 
heightened causation standard out of deference to the employer’s 
business judgment.
187
 By contrast, harassment cases do not implicate 
business judgment.
188
 Thus, there is less concern in harassment cases 
about courts telling employers how to run their companies.
189
 
While some early sexual harassment cases looked for evidence 
that the harasser consciously selected the victim on the basis of her 
sex, over time most courts abandoned an intent-based analysis of 
causation in harassment cases.
190
 Instead, courts gradually developed a 
                                                 
182
 David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. 
REV. 899, 900 (1993). 
183
 Krieger, supra n. 30, at 1243-44. 
184
 Schwartz, supra n. 29, at 1718. 
185
 Id. 
186
 Id. 
187
 Id. at 1717. 
188
 Id. at 1718. 
189
 See id. 
190
 Id. at 1718-19. 
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“sex per se” rule, which allowed them to infer the causal link between 
the harassment and plaintiff’s sex from the sexual nature of the 
harassing words or conduct.
191
 For over a decade, this rule functioned 
as an evidentiary shortcut to establishing the causation element in Title 
VII cases and obviated the need to develop a formal theory linking 
sexual harassment to sex discrimination.
192
 
But in 1998 the Supreme Court cast serious doubt upon the 
continuing validity of the “sex per se” rule.193 Emphasizing the 
importance of the causation element in the context of same-sex 
harassment, Justice Scalia made the following observation in Oncale: 
“We have never held that workplace harassment, even harassment 
between men and women, is automatically discrimination because of 
sex merely because the words used have sexual content or 
connotations.”194 Although some scholars have argued that this 
language does not necessarily abolish the “sex per se” rule,195 the fact 
that both the majority
196
 and the concurrence
197
 vehemently stressed 
the phrase “because of sex” suggests that courts in harassment cases 
may need to develop a more robust theory of causation. 
Against this backdrop of confusing Title VII jurisprudence, the 
Seventh Circuit has struggled to articulate its own approach to 
causation in harassment cases. The next section argues that the 
Seventh Circuit has approached this element differently in sexual 
harassment cases and in sexist harassment cases. In sexual harassment 
cases, the Seventh Circuit has taken a victim-centered approach and at 
times adopted the “sex per se” rule. In sexist harassment cases, the 
Seventh Circuit has embraced a causation theory that closely 
resembles the intent-based approach of disparate treatment cases. 
 
                                                 
191
 See id. at 1719-25. 
192
 See id. at 1703-04. 
193
 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
194
 Id. 
195
 Schwartz, supra n. 29, at 1787-88. 
196
 Oncale, 523 U.S at 78-81. 
197
 Id. at 82 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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 B. Title VII Causation Analysis in the Seventh Circuit  
 
1. Sexual Harassment Cases: It’s What They’re Doing, Not What 
They’re Thinking  
 
In cases involving overtly sexual terminology or conduct, the 
Seventh Circuit has been willing to analyze the issue of discriminatory 
intent from the point of view of the victim rather than the harasser. The 
court explicitly adopted this approach in King v. Board of Regents of 
the University of Wisconsin System.
198
 Plaintiff Katherine King was an 
assistant professor who alleged that the assistant dean made suggestive 
innuendos, leered at her, touched her, rubbed up against her, placed 
objects between her legs, and forcibly kissed and fondled her.
199
 In 
addition to her Title VII claim, King also brought suit under § 1983 
alleging that the harassment violated her constitutional right to equal 
protection of the law.
200
 As a result, the court had to specifically 
address the different showings of discriminatory intent required for 
each of King’s claims, providing that “[o]ne difference between sexual 
harassment under equal protection and under Title VII . . . is that the 
defendant must intend to harass under equal protection . . . but not 
under Title VII, where the inquiry is solely from the plaintiff's 
perspective.”201  
More recently, the Seventh Circuit reiterated this plaintiff-
centered view in Yuknis v. First Student, Inc.
202
 Although the court 
ultimately dismissed the plaintiff’s claim, it emphasized that a 
conscious intent to discriminate is not required to prevail on a hostile 
work environment theory.
203
 The court explained, “[W]e do not mean 
to suggest that there must be an intention of causing distress or 
offense. A working environment may be deeply hurtful to women even 
                                                 
198
 898 F.2d 533, 537-38 (7th Cir. 1990). 
199
 Id. at 534-35. 
200
 Id. at 537. 
201
 Id. at 537-38 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
202
 481 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 2007). 
203
 Id. 
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though the men who created it were merely trying to please 
themselves, and were thus guilty of insensitivity rather than 
aggression.”204 
However, the most extensive defense of the need to adopt a 
different standard of causation in sexual harassment cases appears in 
the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Doe v. City of Belleville, Illinois.205 At 
the outset, it is important to note that Doe is not controlling precedent 
in the Seventh Circuit. After deciding Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Services, Inc., the Supreme Court vacated Doe and remanded it for 
further consideration in light of Oncale.
206
 Nonetheless, the Doe 
opinion is worth considering both for its application of the “sex per se” 
rule in the context of same sex harassment and for its rejection of a 
victim-centered approach in sexist harassment cases. 
The plaintiffs in Doe were two teenage brothers who had been 
hired by the City of Belleville to cut grass in the municipal 
cemetery.
207
 The boys were subjected to an intense harassment 
campaign by their male coworkers, which included insults, name-
calling, regular threats of rape, and one incident of testicle-grabbing.
208
 
The district court granted Belleville’s motion for summary judgment, 
reasoning that “because both the Does and their harassers were 
heterosexual males, the plaintiffs could not show that they were 
harassed ‘because of’ their sex.”209 
The Seventh Circuit reversed, arguing that when workplace 
harassment has explicit sexual overtones, “the content of that 
harassment in and of itself demonstrates the nexus to the plaintiff's 
gender that Title VII requires.”210 The Seventh Circuit agreed with the 
Third Circuit’s observation that “[t]he intent to discriminate on the 
                                                 
204
 Id. 
205
 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated sub nom. City of Belleville v. Doe, 
523 U.S. 1001 (1998). 
206
 City of Belleville, 523 U.S. at 1001. 
207
 Doe, 119 F.3d at 566. 
208
 Id. at 567. 
209
 Id. at 566. 
210
 Id. at 576. 
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basis of sex in cases involving sexual propositions, innuendo, 
pornographic materials, or sexual derogatory language is implicit, and 
thus should be recognized as a matter of course.”211 The Seventh 
Circuit also quoted approvingly the following remark made by the 
Ninth Circuit: “[S]exual harassment is ordinarily based on sex. What 
else could it be based on?”212 Thus, the Doe Court effectively 
concluded that the subjective motivation of the harasser is irrelevant in 
cases involving explicitly sexual words or conduct. As the court 
observed, “[S]o long as the environment itself is hostile to the plaintiff 
because of her sex, why the harassment was perpetrated (sexual 
interest? misogyny? personal vendetta? misguided humor? boredom?) 
is beside the point.”213 
Although the Doe Court was willing to infer causation solely from 
the nature of the harassing conduct, the court cautioned that such an 
inference would not be appropriate in cases where the alleged 
harassment was non-sexual.
214
 The court provided the following 
example to illustrate:  
 
A woman employed in a male-dominated workplace with an 
antipathy toward female workers might find her tools 
constantly missing, her locker broken into, and her work 
sabotaged, for example, as part of a campaign of harassment 
motivated by her gender yet devoid of sexual innuendo and 
contact. In such a case, the plaintiff necessarily must show 
differential treatment of men and women, or an animus to her 
own gender, in view of the fact that the harassment itself does 
not suggest a nexus to the plaintiff's gender.
215
 
 
                                                 
211
 Doe, 119 F.3d at 566 (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 
1469, 1482 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
212
 Doe, 119 F.3d at 566 (quoting Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th 
Cir.1994) (opinion of Reinhardt, J.) (emphasis in original)). 
213
 Doe, 119 F.3d at 578. 
214
 Id. at 575-76. 
215
 Id. 
29
Novak: The Trouble with "Bitch": Rethinking the Seventh Circuit's Approa
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2012
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 8, Issue 1                              Fall 2012 
 
181 
 
Taken together, the preceding cases suggest that the Seventh 
Circuit has in the past been willing to infer the necessary causal 
relationship between the harasser’s conduct and the victim’s sex in 
cases involving harassment that is overtly sexual. But the Seventh 
Circuit’s reasoning in Doe suggests that the same inference would not 
be warranted in cases where harassment assumes a non-sexual form. 
The next section examines the Seventh Circuit’s approach to analyzing 
causation in situations where harassment is non-sexual but may 
nonetheless be sexist. 
 
2. Sexist Harassment Cases: It’s What They Think About Women That 
Counts  
 
Gender-based harassment is not always sexual.
216
 For example, 
men in a workplace might engage in “taunting, pranks, and other 
forms of hazing designed to remind women that they are different and 
out of place.”217 The challenge facing plaintiffs in such cases is how to 
show that they were targeted for harassment “because of sex.” 
In Smith v. Sheahan, the plaintiff rose to this challenge by 
presenting extensive evidence of the disparate treatment of women in 
her workplace.
218
 Valeria Smith was a guard at the Cook County Jail 
who became involved in a work-related dispute with her coworker, 
Ronald Gamble.
219
 In the course of this dispute, “Gamble called Smith 
a ‘bitch,’ threatened to ‘fuck [her] up,’ pinned her against a wall, and 
twisted her wrist severely enough to damage her ligaments, draw 
blood, and eventually require surgical correction.”220 To show that 
Gamble’s actions were because of her sex, Smith presented affidavits 
from six other female guards, detailing a total of seven incidents in 
which Gamble became verbally abusive and threatened female guards 
                                                 
216
 See Schultz, supra n. 21, at 1687. 
217
 Id. 
218
 189 F.3d 529, 531 (7th Cir. 1999). 
219
 Id. at 530-31. 
220
 Id. at 531. 
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with violence.
221
 The Seventh Circuit concluded that Smith had 
presented sufficient evidence to raise the inference that Gamble 
targeted fellow guards based on their sex.
222
 The court pointed out that 
Gamble’s violent outbursts toward women at work were “unmatched 
by similar reports of verbally and physically aggressive behavior 
toward male co-workers.”223 
In Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC, the plaintiff prevailed on 
her hostile work environment claim by presenting direct evidence of 
her supervisor’s hostility toward women.224 Julie Boumehdi worked as 
a press operator in Plastag’s lithographic press department.225 Over the 
course of ten months, Boumehdi’s supervisor, Ed Vega, made at least 
eighteen sex-based comments to her.
226
 For example, Vega told 
Boumehdi that women do not belong in the pressroom, that women 
should work in flower shops, and that she should clean the pressroom 
because that is what women are supposed to do.
227
 Although the 
district court granted the defendant’s summary judgment motion, the 
Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that “comments evincing anti-
female animus can support a hostile environment claim.”228 
As the above examples illustrate, plaintiffs who are harassed 
through non-sexual conduct can demonstrate that the harassment was 
based on sex by adopting the avenues of proof outlined in Doe and 
Oncale: they can present direct evidence of hostility toward women or 
show disparate treatment of male and female employees in a mixed-
sex workplace.
229
 But what happens if the harassers do not openly 
                                                 
221
 Id.  
222
 Id. at 533. 
223
 Id. 
224
 489 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2007). 
225
 Id. at 785. 
226
 Id. at 786. 
227
 Id.  
228
 Id. at 788. 
229
 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998); 
Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 575-76 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated sub 
nom. City of Belleville v. Doe, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998). 
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proclaim hostility to women? And what if there are no other female 
coworkers? The Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Galloway and 
Passananti suggests that in such cases, the court might be more likely 
to probe the harassers’ minds to find out what motivated the 
harassment. Both of these cases turned on the highly subjective 
concept of personal animus; the plaintiff in Galloway lost because the 
court concluded this factor was present in her case and the plaintiff in 
Passananti won because the court concluded it was absent.
230
 
Is getting into the harasser’s head the only way to deal with 
causation in cases like Galloway and Passananti? The next section 
assesses the practical difficulties with adopting a standard dependent 
on discovering and interpreting the subjective motivation of the 
harasser. 
 
C. Dissecting the Harassing Mind: Problems with a Subjective 
Motivation Standard 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s opinions in Galloway and Passananti 
suggest that in order to figure out whether non-sexual verbal 
harassment occurred “because of sex” it is necessary to determine why 
the harasser targeted the plaintiff. In Galloway, the court concluded 
that the harasser was motivated by personal animus and thus did not 
act on the basis of sex.
231
 In Passananti, the court concluded that there 
was no contextual evidence of personal animus and thus it was 
reasonable to infer the harasser was motivated by the plaintiff’s sex.232 
Lurking beneath the court’s analysis in both cases is an implicit 
assumption that harassers make the decision to harass based on a 
single factor and that this factor can be discovered by analyzing the 
context in which the harassment occurs. There are several problems 
with approaching harassment cases from this perspective. 
                                                 
230
 See Passananti v. Cook Cnty., 689 F.3d 655, 665 (7th Cir. 2012); Galloway 
v. Gen. Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1168 (7th Cir. 1996), 
abrogated on other grounds by Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 
(2002). 
231
 Galloway, 78 F.3d at 1168. 
232
 Passananti, 689 F.3d at 665. 
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First, this model ignores the reality that very few actions or 
decisions derive from a single cause.
233
 The conduct of harassment can 
be honestly based on the nondiscriminatory reason proffered by the 
defendant and still nonetheless be tainted by intergroup bias.
234
 In 
other words, even though the harasser in Galloway may very well have 
harbored a personal animus toward the plaintiff, that fact alone does 
not rule out the possibility that his behavior was also motivated by the 
plaintiff’s gender.235 The Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Galloway 
obscures this possibility and treats personal animus and gender animus 
as two mutually exclusive explanations of the harasser’s behavior. 
Second, the subjective motivation standard effectively borrows its 
intent-based theory of causation from the disparate treatment cases, 
thereby injecting unnecessary complexity into harassment caselaw. 
Unlike disparate treatment cases, harassment cases do not involve 
discrete personnel decisions but consist of continuous conduct often 
stretching over long time periods.
236
 As such, it is not clear at what 
precise point in time the court should inquire into the harasser’s 
mental state or motivations. In addition, harassment claims do not 
raise the same deterrence concerns as cases involving personnel 
decisions. The heightened causation standard in disparate treatment 
cases may be necessary to avoid chilling employers in exercising their 
right to make legitimate business decisions about the composition of 
their workforce.
237
 By contrast, there is no comparable concern about 
over-deterring harassers from engaging in harassing conduct. Finally, 
relying on the causation standard developed in disparate impact cases 
amounts to implicitly accepting the assumption that most 
discrimination is conscious and intentional. This assumption is 
inconsistent with empirical reality.
238
  
                                                 
233
 Krieger, supra n. 30, at 1223. 
234
 See id. 
235
 See Gregory, supra n. 65, at 768. 
236
 See Schwartz, supra n. 29, at 1719. 
237
 Id. at 1717-18. 
238
 See Krieger, supra n. 30, at 1164-65. 
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A third problem with focusing on the harasser’s motivations is 
that, even when the motivations are known, they may still be difficult 
to interpret. This difficulty is illustrated in the exchange that took 
place between the majority and the dissent in the King case.
239
 
Because the plaintiff in King brought her sexual harassment claim 
under both Title VII and § 1983, the court had to make an explicit 
finding of intent to harass on the basis of sex in order to hold the 
defendant liable for violating the equal protection clause.
240
 Dean 
Sonstein, the alleged harasser, claimed that “his actions were merely 
the result of his desire for King as an individual and, therefore, were 
not sex-based harassment.”241 The majority concluded that Sonstein’s 
actions were based on the plaintiff’s gender because they were 
motivated by his sexual desire for her.
242
 The court opined, 
“[T]reatment of [an] individual based on sexual desire is sexually 
motivated. Sonstein’s sexual desire does not negate his intent; rather it 
affirmatively establishes it.”243 In his dissent, Judge Manion opined 
that the plaintiff failed to establish the required discriminatory intent, 
arguing, “Sonstein harassed Katherine King because she was 
Katherine King, not because she was female.”244 Thus, although both 
the majority and the dissent started with the harasser’s self-proclaimed 
motivation of sexual desire, each opinion interpreted the significance 
of this motivation and its relationship to the plaintiff’s sex differently. 
Finally, focusing on the harasser’s subjective motivation obscures 
the fact that discrimination can be analyzed just as validly from the 
point of view of the victim.
245
 “If one views ‘discrimination’ as an 
injurious act or course of conduct, sex can be a ‘cause’ of that injury 
not only if the actor’s motivation was the plaintiff’s sex, under the 
                                                 
239
 King v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 
1990). The facts of this case are discussed above in Part III B.2. 
240
 Id. at 537. 
241
 Id. at 538. 
242
 Id. at 539. 
243
 Id. 
244
 Id. at 542 (Manion, J., dissenting). 
245
 See Schwartz, supra n. 29, at 1781. 
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traditional view, but also if the plaintiff experienced injurious conduct 
‘because of her sex.’”246 Thus, plaintiffs who experience harassment as 
based on their sex will suffer the same degree of harm regardless of 
whether their harassers harbored a conscious hostility toward women 
or whether they were acting on the basis of an unconscious bias. 
In sum, the subjective motivation standard is problematic because 
it erroneously assumes that harassment is actuated by a single cause, 
relies on an intent-based theory of causation that is ill-fitted to 
harassment claims, glosses over the difficulty of interpreting motives, 
and ignores the importance of acknowledging the victim’s point of 
view. At the same time, some showing of a connection between the 
plaintiff’s sex and the defendant’s conduct is mandated by Title VII’s 
requirement that the harassment occur “because of sex.” The next 
section will consider how plaintiffs can establish causation without 
probing the harassers’ minds. 
 
PART IV: GETTING OUT OF THE HARASSER’S HEAD – ALTERNATIVE 
APPROACHES TO CAUSATION IN SEXIST HARASSMENT CASES 
 
A. Focusing on the Conduct: The “But-For” Test 
 
One alternative to analyzing the subjective mental state of the 
harasser is to focus solely on the conduct. Thus, in cases involving 
harassment that is not explicitly sexual, the court would ask the 
following question: “Would the harasser have engaged in this conduct 
if the plaintiff were a man instead of a woman?” (or vice versa). In 
fact, many courts have interpreted the holdings of Meritor, Harris, and 
Oncale to require this “but-for” analysis of causation.247 
The main advantage of the “but-for” test is that it comports with 
the formal equality theory of Title VII that has been embraced by most 
judges.
248
 This theory sees the goal of Title VII as promoting color-
                                                 
246
 Id. 
247
 See Leeser, supra n. 10, at 1752. 
248
 See Schwartz, supra n. 29, at 1776-77. 
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blind and sex-blind workspaces.
249
 A violation of Title VII occurs 
anytime an employer considers an employee’s sex in making a 
personnel decision.
250
 Thus, if the harasser would not have engaged in 
the harassing conduct but for the victim’s sex, then the harasser has 
impermissibly taken sex into account and a Title VII violation has 
occurred. 
The “but-for” test has several shortcomings. First, the test is 
relatively easy to apply in a case like Smith where the plaintiff 
presented affidavits from her female coworkers to show that her 
harasser only targeted women.
251
 But in cases involving a single 
victim, the harasser’s conduct is much more difficult to interpret. In 
addition, the “but-for” test is unsuitable in situations involving mixed 
motives.
252
 For example, if the harasser’s conduct indicates hostility to 
the victim because of her sex and because of her job performance, the 
“but-for” test fails to impose liability. This result is inconsistent with 
the formal equality principle of promoting sex-blind workspaces and 
with the text of Title VII which imposes liability on employers 
whenever a prohibited characteristic is a motivating factor for an 
employment practice “even though other factors also motivated the 
practice.”253 
The final and most serious problem with the “but-for” test is that 
it can very easily turn into a subjective motivation analysis. Asking 
whether the harasser would have called the plaintiff a “bitch” if she 
had not been a woman may lead the court to start wondering what 
could have motivated the harasser to use the word “bitch” in the first 
place. Thus, to fully escape the danger of getting stuck in the 
harasser’s head, it may be necessary to analyze Title VII causation 
from the victim’s point of view. 
 
                                                 
249
 See id. at 1775-76. 
250
 See id. 
251
 Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 531 (7th Cir. 1999). 
252
 See Leeser, supra n. 10, at 1779 (discussing the problem of causal 
overdetermination). 
253
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2011). 
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B. Focusing on the Victim: The Perceived Discrimination Test  
 
A victim-centered approach to analyzing causation is more 
consistent with a protected class theory of Title VII.
254
 This theory 
sees Title VII as a tool to eradicate the vestiges of past discrimination 
against women and minorities.
255
 Under this view, harassment must be 
understood in the context of the historical imbalance of power between 
men and women.
256
 For some women, the word “bitch” can “conjure 
up the entire history of male-on-female abuse.”257 Because gender-
motivated violence is more likely to be perpetrated by men against 
women than vice versa,
258
 a woman may be more likely than a man to 
experience verbal abuse as “a prelude to physical violence.”259 
A victim-centered standard could be articulated as either an 
objective or subjective test. Thus, a court might ask “would a 
reasonable victim have perceived the harasser’s actions to be 
motivated by sex?” or “did this victim perceive the harasser’s actions 
to be motivated by sex?” Each approach has its own benefits and 
drawbacks. 
 
1. The Pros and Cons of a Subjective Standard 
 
The main advantage of a subjective standard is its recognition that 
harassment can be perceived as discriminatory even if the harasser 
lacks conscious intent to discriminate. Harassment victims often suffer 
real harm. They may “perform below capacity at their jobs or seek 
inferior employment as a way of avoiding harassment.”260 If a 
harassment victim honestly but mistakenly believes that the harasser’s 
                                                 
254
 See Schwartz, supra n. 29, at 1776. 
255
 See id. 
256
 See Gregory, supra n. 65, at 768. 
257
 Id.  
258 U.S. Dept. of Justice, No. NCJ 197838, Intimate Partner Violence, 1993-
2001 1 (2003). 
259
 See Gregory, supra n. 65, at 768. 
260
 See Leeser, supra n. 10, at 1774. 
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conduct was motivated by sex, allowing that belief alone to establish 
the causation element of the victim’s Title VII claim is defensible on 
the ground that, as between an innocent victim and a harasser who 
intentionally engaged in wrongful conduct, it is fair to allow the 
victim’s perception to govern. 
The most significant criticism of this subjective standard is that it 
turns solely on the sensitivity of a particular employee, which may be 
difficult to foresee and which lies outside of the employer’s control. 
This concern might have prompted the Oncale Court to emphasize that 
careful attention to the causation element is necessary to avoid 
transforming Title VII into “a general civility code for the American 
workplace.”261 Allowing causation to be determined solely on the basis 
of the plaintiff’s perception might arguably result in the proliferation 
of frivolous sexual harassment claims.
262
 
Although this concern is valid, the judge-made law of sexual 
harassment contains other safeguards designed to limit the floodgates 
of litigation.
263
 First, sexual harassment plaintiffs must show that the 
conduct was severe or pervasive.
264
 The Seventh Circuit has not 
hesitated to grant summary judgment in cases where plaintiffs failed to 
meet this requirement.
265
 In addition, a pair of cases decided by the 
Supreme Court in 1998 has provided employers with an affirmative 
defense against sexual harassment claims if the employer can show 
that (1) it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly 
                                                 
261
 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
262
 See Schwartz, supra n. 29, at 1738. 
263
 Id. at 1739. 
264
 Id. 
265
 See, e.g., Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 933 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(“[S]poradic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing 
are fairly commonplace in some employment settings and ‘do not amount to 
actionable harassment.’” (quoting Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 
1151, 1159 (8th Cir.1999))); Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 361-62 
(7th Cir. 1998) (teasing, ambiguous comments, and four isolated incidents in which 
a co-worker briefly touched plaintiff’s arm, fingers, or buttocks were not severe or 
pervasive enough to constitute sexual harassment); Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 
50 F.3d 428, 431-32 (7th Cir. 1995) (a handful of suggestive comments spread out 
over seven months did not amount to actionable sexual harassment). 
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any sexually harassing behavior, and (2) the plaintiff unreasonably 
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities 
provided by the employer.
266
 An employer can satisfy this requirement 
by showing that it has a sexual harassment policy, it promptly 
investigates sexual harassment complaints, and it takes corrective 
action.
267
 Taken together, the severe and pervasive element and the 
availability of an affirmative defense discourage unmeritorious claims 
and guard against transforming Title VII into a civility code. 
 
2. The Pros and Cons of an Objective Standard 
 
For those who believe that the causation element should fulfill the 
same gate-keeping function as the severity requirement, adopting an 
objective victim-centered standard may be a satisfactory compromise. 
An objective standard takes care of the egg-shell plaintiff problem by 
asking whether a reasonable victim would have perceived the 
harasser’s conduct to be based on sex. The main advantage of this 
approach is that it imposes a threshold reasonability requirement for 
the causation element. 
The chief concern with an objective victim-centered standard is 
that it may evolve into a reasonable woman standard.
268
 The danger 
with telling judges or juries to consider how a reasonable person might 
interpret the harasser’s conduct is that it may inadvertently encourage 
fact-finders to rely on gender stereotypes and conclude that female 
plaintiffs would be more likely to perceive harassment as 
discriminatory because women are oversensitive.
269
 Inherent 
paternalism aside, this attitude is problematic because it favors female 
plaintiffs charging sexual harassment against male harassers but not 
vice versa.
270
 Granted, this outcome is less troubling for those who 
                                                 
266
 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington 
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
267
 See Savino, at 199 F.3d at 932-33. 
268
 See Hill, supra n. 57, at 172. 
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view Title VII as a way of leveling the playing field given the history 
of discrimination women have traditionally encountered in the 
workplace. But for those who espouse a sex-blind view of Title VII or 
who aim to apply the law in same-sex harassment cases, such a result 
is more difficult to justify.  
In sum, analyzing causation from the point of view of the victim 
rather than that of the harasser has several advantages. Focusing on the 
victim recognizes that conduct can have a discriminatory effect even if 
the harasser is not acting on the basis of conscious bias. More 
importantly, a victim-centered approach does not require the court to 
get inside the harasser’s head. It does not give the harasser the option 
of getting away with the behavior by blaming it on personal animus. 
While victim-centered approaches are not completely problem-free, 
they are more workable in practice than is a standard that requires a 
court to figure out why the harasser engaged in the offending conduct 
in order to determine that the conduct occurred “because of sex.” 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The trouble with “bitch” is that the message it communicates 
about the harasser’s attitude toward women in general is ambiguous. 
In Galloway, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the word is not 
gender-derogatory. In Passanati, the court reached the opposite 
conclusion. These contradictory opinions highlight the chief difficulty 
with relying on a subjective motivation standard to establish the 
causation element of a harassment claim. In order to determine 
whether the harasser was consciously motivated by hostility toward 
women, a judge must infer the presence or absence of such hostility 
from the word “bitch” alone. This highly speculative exercise is likely 
to result in decisions that merely reflect the opinion of a particular 
judge about the meaning of “bitch.” Thus, the subjective motivation 
standard offers very little guidance to future litigants and threatens to 
produce an inconsistent and arbitrary body of harassment law. 
On the other hand, analyzing causation from the point of view of 
the victim is a more workable standard. This approach does not require 
the court to get inside the harasser’s head but focuses instead on the 
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victim’s interpretation of the offending conduct. In the subjective 
version of this test, a victim’s credible testimony that she perceived the 
harassment to be based on sex will suffice to establish the causation 
element. In the objective version, a judge or a jury will decide whether 
a reasonable person would have perceived the harassment as 
motivated by sex. This test eliminates the speculative guesswork about 
what the harasser was thinking. It refocuses the inquiry on the 
objective conduct and the injury suffered by the victim who perceived 
the conduct as discriminatory. If the goal of Title VII is to deter 
discriminatory behavior, rather than to police discriminatory thinking, 
then the victim-centered approach advances that objective more 
effectively. 
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